Abstract. This paper describes the development and verification of a competitive parachute system for Micro Air Vehicles, in particular focusing on verification of the embedded software. We first introduce the overall solution including a system level failure analysis, and then show how we minimized the influence of faulty software. This paper demonstrates that with careful abstraction and little overapproximation, the entire code running on a microprocessor can be verified using bounded model checking, and that this is a useful approach for resourceconstrained embedded systems. The resulting Emergency Recovery System is to our best knowledge the first of its kind that passed formal verification, and furthermore is superior to all other existing solutions (including commercially available ones) from an operational point of view.
Introduction
In the recent years, Micro Air Vehicles (MAVs) such as quadrocopters, hexacopters, etc., are a rapidly growing class of airspace users. As of January 2015, we estimate the number of light MAVs (<5 kg) to be at least 1.6 million in Europe 1 , possibly even one magnitude higher due to the plethora of manufacturers and custom builds. In comparison, this is more than quadruple the number of aircraft in general aviation worldwide [1] , and soon, if not already, the daily flying hours will also catch up, thanks to a growing number of civil use cases.
However, in contrast to aircraft in general aviation, MAVs are usually not subject to in-depth safety considerations, but tend to have a high probability of failure. This comes from the nature of these systems: They are open for modifications, little analyzed, and often not fully understood by their operator. Together with the omnipresence of those vehicles, this results in a considerable potential of MAVs endangering their environment.
Whatever solution is chosen to increase the level of safety, it has to be tailored towards those low-cost, mass-market systems. Imposing certification rules on the entire MAV, such as DO-178C for civil A/C software, could eventually hold back a number of desirable use cases. For example, certification could require redundancy in the flight controls, which would decrease payload capacity and thus render some applications infeasible. Last but not least, low cost is also a key for those platforms, which generally contradicts a full-system certification.
In this paper, we describe our experiences in developing a light-weight recovery system which increases the operational safety of MAVs and is nevertheless amenable to certification, independently from the internal structure of the MAV. It is a hardwaresoftware solution based on a parachute, which can bring down the MAV safely, avoiding loss of the MAV in case of malfunctions, and minimizing collateral damage. Our system is a "plug and play" solution, i.e., it can be retrofitted to existing MAVs with only one single interface (the power connector) and has little impact on the flight performance.
In the following we first explain the overall solution, and then focus on the verification of the embedded software, which is the most complex part, and meanwhile the main contributor towards the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
Related work
MAV Safety Systems: In general, the safety systems available by today are either specific to the MAV brand, incomplete, or require radical modifications to the existing MAV. For example, there are MAVs that ship with a parachute system, such as the MCFLY-Helios [9], or others which can be extended with OEM parachute systems, such as the "DropSafe" for the DJI Phantom [8] . However, being tightly integrated with their specific MAVs, the trigger conditions are not made public, and there is no formal proof illustrating the increased overall safety. Moreover, they require CO 2 capsules and a backup battery, as opposed to our solution. Other available systems are "operated" solutions, such as the Opale [15] , SKYCAT [17] or MARS [13] parachute systems. They only support a manual release, do not switch off the MAV propulsion and require, as the others before, a working power supply in case of emergency.
There are also more local approaches to increase the safety of subsystems, such as robust control algorithms by Mueller and D'Andrea [14] . Their algorithms can cope with partial loss of propulsion whilst keeping the MAV in a controlled flight. However, not only do they require a lot of insight into and modification of the MAV, they also demand significant non-local changes, as for example the provisioning of safety margins in the propulsion (e.g., more thrust per motor, higher peak current etc.). Eventually, those margins make the MAV inefficient under normal conditions, but still only cover a subset of all possible MAV failures.
The parachute solution that we propose offers similar operational limits than the mentioned automatic systems, but is MAV-independent and covers the maximum number of failure conditions among the mentioned solutions, and at a lower weight. Additionally, through the verification shown here, we have evidence that the overall MAV safety is indeed increased, as opposed to all other solutions. Verification of Code Running on Microprocessors: Model-checking the entire C code running on microprocessors has been reported only a couple of times, e.g., with cbmc on an ATmega16 processor in [16] and on an MSP430 in [4] , but either it failed because of state space explosion and missing support for concurrency, or succeeded only for smaller programs.
However, recent developments that turn concurrency into data nondeterminism [11] , spot race conditions [20] and support for interrupts in cbmc [4] can solve the concurrency issues and make bounded model checking an interesting approach. In this paper we take together all these ideas, point out problem with those, and propose abstractions which mitigate the state space explosion, enabling a workflow which allows verifying an entire real-world program running on a microcontroller.
The main design challenge for this system is to maintain a low weight, since this directly translates into flight time. This however means we can introduce redundancy only where inevitable for safety.
Second, to make the system work independently of MAV internals, it implies that the interface to the MAV must be minimalist. Standard approaches known from avionics like triplex controllers (see [2, p. 88] ) with its internal data consolidation are too intrusive and therefore not an option.
The biggest challenge however, is deciding whether there is an emergency, and triggering the recovery independently of the pilot. A software implementation is the natural choice, since this allows for iterative development and parametrization for the specific MAV. This software is then safety-critical, since it directly influences whether crashes can be avoided or not. Through this, the quality of the software will drive the quality of the overall solution. That is why in this paper our main concern is a formal verification of the software, which is known to be challenging, especially because this software interacts with its physical environment.
Proposed Emergency Recovery System for MAVs
Our proposed Emergency Recovery System (ERS) is shown in Fig. 1 , both on a quadrocopter and a hexacopter. It is a parachute system, designed to increase the overall safety of the MAV. In case of an emergency (what constitutes an emergency is described later), the ERS automatically turns off the propulsion and deploys a parachute. The technical specifications are given in Table 1 . No modifications to the existing MAV are required, e.g., neither altering the flight controller nor the propulsion system. Our system effectively acts as a power proxy between MAV battery and MAV. The only (necessary) interface for our ERS is the power connector, which is why we call it a "plug and play" solution. A second optional interface is for one RC channel, allowing the pilot to trigger the parachute manually.
Internal Structure
The ERS consists of the following three components, also illustrated in Fig. 2: -Emergency Detection Unit (EDU): A Printed-Circuit Board (PCB) with sensors and a microprocessor running software to detect emergencies. In case it detects an emergency, it can trigger the ejection of the parachute. -Power Switch (PS): A PCB with power electronics, acting as a proxy between the MAV's battery and the propulsion. In case of emergency, it cuts off the power. -Parachute Unit (PU): This is a housing holding the parachute. It is also comprising an ejection sensor and an electro-magnetic (EM) lock, which, when opened or powerless, releases a compressed spring, which in turn ejects the parachute. Mode of Operation: The EDU features an Atmel ATmega 328p microprocessor (Harvard, 8 MHz, 32 kB Flash, 2 kB RAM, no caches), a barometer sensor and an accelerometer sensor. The embedded software evaluates those sensors periodically, and estimates the MAV's air state. When it detects emergency conditions, it triggers the parachute ejection by emitting a RELEASE signal, which opens the EM lock. This releases a compressed spring, which can now eject the parachute from its housing. Simultaneously, when the parachute is pushed out, an ejection sensor detects this and sends a POWEROFF signal to the Power Switch. This ensures, that the MAV's propulsion is deactivated as soon as the parachute is ejected. Emergency Conditions: The root causes for failure in MAVs are wide-spread. Due to tight integration of functionality and -as explained before -the imperative minimalism in redundancy, even errors in non-critical components can evolve quickly into fatal failures. Therefore, it seems more efficient to apply a holistic monitoring, instead of monitoring single components. Accordingly, an emergency is considered as the MAV being uncontrolled, that is, when the pitch or roll angles exceed user-defined thresholds, or when the descent rate gets too high. These conditions cover the most important malfunctions, such as FCS failure (e.g., badly tuned controllers or error in software logic), electrical or mechanical failure of propulsion (propeller, ESC), loss of power and partially even human error (in the form of initiating an uncontrolled state).
System Level Failure Analysis
Although this paper focuses on software verification, we briefly explain the failure analysis at system level, to show the influence of the software on the overall safety.
We designed our ERS to make it fail-safe together with the MAV w.r.t. any singlefailure event, i.e., a MAV equipped with our ERS can tolerate at least one statistically independent failure without leading to a crash. Towards that, we repeatedly conducted a Fault Tree Analysis during the design process of the ERS.
In Fig. 2 we highlighted a built-in fail-safe loop between power switch, EM lock, parachute and ejection sensor. It creates a circular dependency between its components. If any of them fails (e.g., broken power switch), then this also leads to the ejection of the parachute, thus covering failures that may occur in the ERS itself. The effects of different failure scenarios can be seen in the Fault Tree in Fig. 3 . Considered MAV Failures: The MAV was treated as a black box with two possible failures (grey in the figure) "MAV failure with power" and "MAV failure without power". The first one means, that the MAV is in an uncontrolled state but still powered (e.g., broken propeller and resulting loss of control), whereas the latter one means, that the MAV lost power (e.g., due to battery failure or electronic defects), which naturally results in an uncontrolled state as well. We are not concerned with the MAV being powered up in a controllable state (no error), or being in a controllable but unpowered state (impossible for multicopter configurations). Influence of the Software: The Fault Tree is depicted in Fig. 3 . It can be seen, that the three uncontrolled system states which lead to a crash, can only be reached if at least two failures occur at the same time. As indicated with the color coding, there are four categories of failures: a) mechanical failure in ERS (red), b) electronics failure in ERS (orange), c) software failure in ERS (green) and d) MAV failure (white). Although there are many kinds of errors possible in software, from a system point of view we are only interested in the two consequences depicted in the Fault Tree:
1. Emergency Detection False Negative: The embedded software does not trigger the emergency sequence despite emergency conditions. 2. Emergency Detection False Positive: The embedded software does trigger the emergency sequence without emergency conditions. While both software failure events can have the same impact at system level (both can lead to crash if a second failure occurs), the case of a False Negative is practically more critical, since MAV failures with power are more likely than a second independent failure occurring in the ERS. Furthermore, the ERS runs self-checks during initialization, reducing the probability of being used in the presence of internal failure. For these reasons, our verification efforts that we explain in the next section, focused on (but were not limited to) finding defects that lead to False Negatives.
CRASH

Software Verification
Safety-critical systems in general must be free of defects that can lead to errors in behavior. Here, traditional testing is not favorable, since only a full coverage of all possible executions could guarantee absence of defects, which implies modeling the system's environment in a test harness. That especially holds true for our ERS, where the functionality strongly depends on timing and the interaction with its environment. Testing specific cases would require simulating the environment, as well as the sensors and the microprocessor running the software. On top of that, in our system we cannot afford any redundancy due to weight reasons, which is why we need to identify all defects in the software. Consequently, we aimed for a toolchain that supports formal verification of C code based on static analysis. While there are multiple tools that one could choose for that task (e.g., Frama-C [7] , Astrée [6] , BLAST [10] , Polyspace, etc.), we have selected cbmc and related tools [5] , because they support concurrency to some extent, are freely available (and thus can be extended if necessary) and also widely used. More model checkers for C code were compared in [16] and [3] .
Software Structure: The software running on the EDU can be partitioned into four sequential parts:
1. Initialization: Initializes all sensors, and captures environmental conditions (e.g., pressure at ground level). When completed, the ERS switches to self-check mode. 2. Self-Check: To ensure that there is not already a failure in the ERS during startup, we added built-in self tests covering the major subsystems of the ERS. When completed, the ERS switches to detection mode. 3. Detection: The software periodically reads all sensors and estimates the MAV's air state. If the emergency conditions apply, the EM lock is released and the software switches to emergency handling mode. 4. Emergency Handling: Current sensor data and decision conditions are written to EEPROM, to enable a post-flight analysis.
Microprocessor
Barometer Accelerometer The sensors and actuators are connected to the microcontroller as depicted in Fig. 4 on the left. The interfaces impose some concurrency in the software, which is shown on the right. For example, the maintenance console and manual trigger signal both require interrupts (polling would be too slow), thus each introduces one thread concurrent to the main program. Additionally, a timer interrupt is used to support a time-triggered execution of the detection loop, contributing one further thread. Proper Timing: The mentioned concurrency poses the first verification task. To ensure that the detection loop always runs at the desired rate -which is important for correctness of computed data, e.g., the descent rate -we need to show that the required computations can be completed before the next period begins.
Towards that, the worst-case execution time (WCET) of the main loop must be determined. Here we took a dual approach: On one hand, we performed a static WCET analysis with a freely available analyzer tool [19] , but we also monitor the execution time on the microprocessor with a high watermark.
For the static analysis we made the assumption that the sensors are healthy, and follow their datasheets' timing specification. The resulting WCET was 2.7 ms for the detection loop, which is well below the 5 ms-period in the EDU. However, interrupts also need to be considered. The worst-case response time (WCRT) is (in this context) the maximum amount of time that the detection loop needs to finish processing, under the preemption of interrupts. Only if the WCRT is less than the period, then it can be concluded that the timing is correct.
However, without further provisions the minimum inter-arrival time (MINT) for the event-based interrupts (manual trigger from RC, UART) have no lower bound, i.e., it would be possible that a broken RC receiver or UART peer could induce so many interrupts, that the detection could never execute, resulting in an unbounded WCRT. To avoid this situation, the inter-arrival times of all event-driven interrupts are also measured in the microcontroller. If an interrupt occurs more often than planned, the attached signal source is considered failing, and the interrupt turned off.
With these bounded MINTs and the WCET values from the static analysis, a standard response time analysis yielded a WCRT of 2.89 ms for the detection loop. Again, this is for the case of healthy sensors.
The purpose of the high watermark is to detect those cases when sensors are failing, but also to gain confidence in the above analysis. The response time of the detection loop is continuously measured using a hardware timer, and maximum values are written to EEPROM. With rising number of flying hours, the watermark should approach the WCRT. If it exceeds the statically computed WCRT, then a sensor failure is likely, which triggers the emergency sequence.
In practice, the watermark measurements were observed approaching the statically computed WCRT up to a few hundred microseconds with healthy sensors, thus giving confidence in the analysis. By construction of the software, it can be concluded that the timing of the detection loop is correct, unless the parachute is deployed. However, there are more timing-related issues to be considered, namely, the time-sensitive effects of interrupts upon the control flow in the main program. This was addressed later during the verification process.
Proper Logic: The ultimate goal of the software verification is to ensure that the emergency detection algorithm works as intended. As explained before, the main concern was to avoid False Negatives, i.e., the error that the embedded software does not trigger the emergency sequence, despite emergency conditions. An obvious reason for such failure is, that the software is not running because it crashed or got stuck. This can be a consequence of divisions by zero, heap or stack overflow 2 , invalid memory writes, etc. Note that a reboot during flight is not possible, since the initialization and self-checks need user interaction (open and re-close the ejection sensor to ensure it works correctly), and making them bypassable is not desirable for practical safety reasons. Therefore, crashes and stuck software have to be avoided.
The second reason for not recognizing an emergency is an incorrectly implemented detection algorithm. This entails both an error in decision taking (i.e., which sensor has to tell what in order to classify it as emergency), and also numerical problems (e.g., overflows) in data processing. Identifying these kinds of problems also decreases the number of False Positives.
The majority of those defects is checked automatically by cbmc, if requested during instrumentation. The correctness of the decision taking part, however, must be encoded with user assertions. Since our detection loop runs time-triggered, properties such as "latest 100 ms after free fall conditions are recognized, the parachute shall be deployed" can be encoded with some temporary variables. With that, verification of arbitrary properties of the decision algorithm follows the same workflow as the automatically instrumented properties, which is why we do not elaborate on the specific properties that were eventually verified, but rather show how we set up the workflow correctly.
Verification Workflow
The toolchain that we set up around cbmc is shown in Fig. 5 . We start with a C program, written for the target. First, we run fast static checkers such as splint on the program, to identify and remove problems like uninitialized variables, problematic type casts etc. Not only does this help to avoid defects early during development and thus to reduce the number of required verification runs later on, but also it complements the verification. For example, the semantics of an uninitialized variable depends on the compiler and the used operating system (if any); cbmc, however, regards these variables as nondeterministic and therefore overapproximates the program without a warning.
After passing the fast checks, the C code is given to goto-cc, which translates it into a GOTO-program, basically a control flow graph. During this process, all the macros in the C code are resolved by running the host compiler up to the preprocessing stage.
The GOTO-program is subsequently fed into goto-instrument, which adds assert statements according to user wishes. For example, each arithmetic multiplication can be checked for overflow, array bounds can be ensured, etc. Note that the original code may contain user-defined assert statements, which are preserved.
The resulting instrumented GOTO-program is finally handed over to cbmc, which performs loop unwinding, picks up all assert statements, generates VCCs for them and -after optional simplifications such as slicing -passes the problem to a solver back-end (we use MiniSat2 ; SMT solvers like Z3 and Yices, are recent additions to cbmc).
After the back-end returns the proofs, cbmc post-processes them and provides a list of verified properties, and for each refuted one a counterexample. These lists can be used to fix defects in the original code, clearing the way for the next iteration.
Missing Architectural Information
A problem in static verification is implicit semantics that depends on the target, for example that certain functions are set up as interrupt service routines (ISRs) and thus their effect needs to be considered, although they never seem to be invoked. Another example is memory-mapped I/O, which may seem like ordinary reads from memory, but in fact could inject nondeterministic inputs from the environment.
2 Heap was not used, and stack size was checked with Bound-T. Neglecting such context can easily lead to a collapsing verification problem and result in wrong outcomes. In our program, there were initially 351 properties, from which 349 were unreachable due to missing contextual information. Annotating all the necessary places manually is an error-prone labour, which bears the risk of having wrong or missing annotations and more importantly it is practically infeasible for our small program already. In the following we discuss how we addressed this problem. Accounting for Interrupts: The preprocessed C code contains the ISR definitions, but naturally no functions call to them. The ISR is only called because its identifier is known to the cross compiler, and because particular bits are being written to registers at the start of the program; something that the model-checker lacks knowledge of. Consequently, it concludes that the ISR is never executed, and -through data dependencies -our detection algorithm seems to be never executed. This makes all properties within that algorithm unreachable and thus incorrectly evaluates them as "verified".
C program + assumptions
To overcome this, a nondeterministic invocation of the ISR must be considered at all places where shared variables are being evaluated, as described in [4] . This can be done with goto-instrument as a semantic transformation (flag --isr). Fig. 4 shows the respective data that depends on interrupts in our case. Unfortunately, this technique not only grows the to-be-explored state space, but it even overapproximates the interrupts: The ISR could be considered too often in the case when the minimum inter-arrival time is longer than the "distance" of the nondeterministic calls (e.g., ISR for periodic timer overflow) that have been inserted. However, even if we would include execution time and scheduling information from parts of the main thread (to be computed by WCET and WCRT tools), the points in time where the ISR is called could be drifting w.r.t. to the main thread. This is true even for perfectly periodically triggered programs, solely due to different execution paths in the main thread. Nondeterminism from Frequency-Dependent Side Effects: There exists another problem with interrupts that has not been addressed in [4] nor in goto-instrument. It stems from the frequency-dependent side effects of ISR invocation: In general, interrupts could also execute more often than the places where nondeterministic calls have been considered before. If there exist side effects other than changes to shared variables (i.e., if the ISR is non-reentrant in general), this can break the correct outcome of the verification. For example, ISRs that on each invocation increment some counter variable which is not shared with any other thread, could then in reality have a higher counter value than seen by the model checker 3 . In other words, all persistent variables that are manipulated by the ISR have to be modeled as nondeterministic, not only shared variables. In our case there were only three such variables (one was for the time-triggered release of the detection loop), which have been identified and annotated manually. Memory-Mapped I/O: All I/O variables (the sensor inputs) must be annotated to be nondeterministic. One option for that would be using the flag --nondet-volatile for goto-instrument to regard all volatiles as nondeterministic, however, this results in overapproximation for all shared variables (which are volatile as well), allowing for valuations which are actually infeasible due to the nature of the algorithms operating on the shared variable. Furthermore, this can override user-defined assumptions on the value domain of sensors, considering actually impossible executions and thus produce False Negatives on the verified properties.
In our case the microcontroller runs bare-metal code and uses memory-mapped I/O to read sensors, i.e., accesses show up in the preprocessed C code as dereferencing an address literal. In principle, it is therefore possible to identify such reads after the C preprocessing stage. However, in general it is a non-trivial problem to identify all these places, since indirect addressing is possible, which would require a full value analysis of the program to figure out whether the effective address is in the I/O range. At the moment we do not have a practical solution to this problem, which is why we instrumented all inputs manually. To support this process, we developed a clangbased [12] tool which generates a list of all dereferencing operations, suggesting the places that should be considered for annotating nondeterminism in the C code. Since we minimized the use of pointers to keep verification effort lower, the majority of the entries in this list is indeed reading input registers.
Preprocessing against State-Space Explosion
After all architectural information has been added, the next big challenge is to verify the instrumented properties. A problem here is, that the state space grows rapidly from the architectural features, especially from the ISRs. In our case, the program has around 2,500 lines of C code, and running cbmc already fails for two reasons: (1) the program contains unbounded loops and (2) even if the loops were somehow bounded, there would be too many SAT variables to be considered (millions in our case). Building Sequential Modes: The original structure of our program could not be verified, because the initialization and self-checks, were implemented as part of one hierarchic state machine, executed in main loop. The necessary loop unwinding then expanded the entire state machine as a whole. This resulted in too many SAT variables and could not be processed on our machine (we run out of memory after hours, having done only a fraction of the necessary unwinding).
To overcome this state space problem, we first partitioned our program into sequential modes, see Fig. 6 . Each the initialization, the self-tests and the detection were refactored into their own loops, which take place one after another. Interrupts were enabled as late as possible, reducing the number of states to explore. Assume-Guarantee Reasoning: However, at this point it turned out, that the initialization and self-checks still contributed too many variables for the program to be analyzed as a whole. As a countermeasure, the modes should now be analyzed independently and reasoning on the overall correctness should be done using assume-guarantee reasoning. Towards that, it was necessary to identify all possible program states between the modes, e.g., the detection mode can only be properly analyzed, if all possible program states after initialization and self-check are considered. One concrete example is, that the ERS determines the air pressure at ground level during the initialization, which is used later during detection. Verifying the detection mode thus involves considering all possible pressure levels, by assuming nondeterministic values for them.
To reduce the complexity of assume-guarantee reasoning, we first turned each mode into a potentially infinite loop which can only exit, if everything works as expected These "guards" reduce the number of program states to be considered for the postdecessor modes. For example, when analyzing the detection mode, we only need to consider program states corresponding to successful initialization and self-checks.
To construct the program states between modes, we identified all live variables between each two successive modes, i.e., all variables which are written in one mode and possibly being read in its successor modes. As this is another error-prone work that should not be done manually, we extended our clang-based tool to take this step automatically.
After having identified the live variables at the end of each mode, we instrumented them as illustrated in Listing 1: First, we added a nondeterministic assignment to each variable just before the new mode starts (line 6). This allows for all possible values, once the analysis on the new mode starts. Then, if due to some logical reason the value range could be limited, we used an assume statement to restrict analysis to this value range (line 7). However, to guarantee that the value domain is indeed complete, i.e., ensuring that no possible execution has been neglected, we added a matching assert statement at the exit of the predecessor mode (line 3). A successful verification of the predecessor mode (here: X) means the asserts hold true, therefore guarantees that live variables indeed satisfy the assumptions we make at the beginning of the new mode (here: Y). Assume-guarantee reasoning therefore is sound. Finding the value ranges is currently done manually; in doubt one can omit the ranges, which leads to a safe over-approximation. However, tool support would be favorable, since tight ranges means no false alerts during verification.
In summary, this mode-building reduced the number of properties from 458 to below 250 in each mode, with 31 shared variables between them that were subject to assume-guarantee process (see Table 2 ). Removing Dead Code: When going through the verification process shown in Fig. 5 , it is desirable to entirely remove dead code (especially after mode-building and analyzing the modes separately), otherwise a lot of unreachable properties will be there, slowing down the analysis and cluttering the results. Although goto-instrument offers two slicing options, none of them removes dead code. This task is not trivial, since in our case the modes share code, e.g, both self-check and detection use a function that reads out the accelerometer. Again, we used our clang-based tool for this task, which operates on the C code that is equivalent to the GOTO-program and removes dead functions and variables (see Fig. 5 ). Bounding Non-local Loops: A complexity-increasing problem for verification are nested, stateful function calls, as they occur in hierarchical state machines. Our program uses such hierarchical state machines to interact with the barometer and accelerometer peripherals. If one of the inner states has transition guards, then the entire hierarchy needs unrolling until these guards evaluate to true. In our case, we have guards like waiting for ADC conversion to finish. Unfortunately, hierarchic state machines are a popular design pattern in model-based design (e.g., Statemate, Stateflow, SCADE), which therefore needs to be addressed rather than avoided.
We found that some guards in the inner state machines can be removed safely, reducing costly unrolling. Assume that the guard will eventually evaluate to true (even if there is no upper bound on the number of steps it takes): If all live data that is written after this point is invariant to the number of iterations, then the guard can be removed. Consequently, such irrelevant guards can be identified by first performing an impact analysis (find all variables that are influenced by the guard), followed by a loop invariance test (identify those which are modified on re-iteration) followed by a live variable analysis on the result (from the influenced ones, identify those which are being read later during execution). If the resulting set of variables is empty, then the guard can be removed safely. This technique is of great help for interacting with peripherals, where timing may not influence the valuations, but otherwise contribute to state space explosion. The technique is easily extended, if there are multiple guards. On the other hand, if a guard potentially never evaluates to true, e.g., due to a broken sensor, then there are two ways to treat this: If this is valid behavior, then this guard can be ignored for the analysis (no execution exists after it). If it is invalid behavior, then the guard should be extended by an upper re-try bound and this new bounded guard can then be treated as explained above. After these transformations all state machines could be successfully unrolled.
Keeping Assumptions Sound
We made use of assumptions for limiting value domains where possible, and to perform assume-guarantee reasoning. Assumptions are a powerful tool in cbmc, however, it is easy to add assumptions which are not satisfiable (UNSAT). Those rule out all executions after the assume statement and thus might lead to wrong verification results.
Therefore, we have to ensure that the composite of all annotations is sound, otherwise the verification outcome may be wrong despite the individual annotations being correct. To check whether assumptions can be satisfied, we added a new check to cbmc, which does the following: It inserts an assert(false) after each assumption and subsequently runs the SAT solver on it. If the solver yields UNSAT for the assertion, it means it is reachable and thus the assumption is valid. If it yields SAT, then all executions were ruled out and thus the assumption is UNSAT and thus unsound. Finally, we warn the user for each UNSAT assumption.
Verification Results
With our extensions of existing tools we were able to set up a correct verification workflow for the software of the ERS. The complexity of the analysis (for each mode: run-time, number of variables etc.) is summarized in Table 2 . During the process we identified several trivial and non-trivial defects, some of them were one deadlock in a state machine, multiple overflows in sensor data processing and even one timing-related error (barometer update took more steps than anticipated, which lead to wrong descent rate). Interestingly enough, during flight tests we sporadically experienced some of these errors, which by then could not be explained. One of the reasons for this is, that there was little information about these errors due to limited logging and debugging facilities on the microcontroller, and that we could not reproduce the environmental conditions in the lab.
Conclusion
In this paper we described our approaches in developing a safety-critical emergency recovery system for MAVs, in particular our efforts in applying methods and tools for formal verification of embedded software. This study has shown that formal verification of the entire, original software running on a microcontroller is possible, if appropriate preprocessing techniques are applied. The state space can be reduced to a size that can be covered by existing tools, but careful handling is necessary to obtain correct results. The efforts did pay off in our case. Not only could we identify defects in the software, but we obtained counterexamples for the defects, which can be the only useful source of debugging information for resource-constrained embedded systems.
As future work, we are planning to extend our clang-based tool to perform not only some, but all the steps we have taken automatically, as well as a complementary software supporting the described iterative workflow.
